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This paper examines Mexico’s governmentality of extracontinental migration in transit to the 
United States. It argues that, in the context of transit control regimes, exemption is 
instrumentalised as a bordering mechanism and practice in which transit states assume, 
react and utilise their role as a ‘transit’ country. By drawing on statistical information about 
migrant populations from Asia and Africa intercepted by Mexican authorities from 2010 to 
2019, four arrangements are identified: (1) sporadic expulsion, (2) regularisation façade, (3) 
guardianship and (4) self-deportation. The analysis sheds light on the transformative and 
adaptive dimension of the Mexican Transit Control Regime and how this is geared towards 
maintaining its focus on intercepting and deterring Central American migrants in transit to 
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In August 2019, after two weeks of protest outside the Mexican migration detention facility, Siglo XXI, 812 
African migrants stranded in Tapachula, Chiapas, obtained the nullity of the migratory resolution issued 
the previous month that ordered them to leave Mexico through the southern border, basically targeting 
and preventing their transit mobility to the United States (Pradilla 2019; Romero 2019). The Mexican 
migration enforcement agency, Instituto Nacional de Migración, was requested to issue a new resolution 
allowing migrants to leave Mexico by the border of their choice. This migratory resolution was, in fact, an 
oficio de salida del país, a definitive departure (DD) resolution; however, it is commonly termed as a free 
transit agreement (FT) since for migrants, it means the possibility of reaching the Unites States’ (US) 
southern border without the risk of being intercepted again by Mexican authorities. This case shows the 
use and instrumentalisation of exemption in the governmentality of extracontinental migration in transit 
through Mexico. Yet, it is noteworthy that this is not the first time that the Mexican authorities have 
exempted an organised group of migrants in transit from deportation; in 2014, in response to what is 
known as the first migrant caravan, they also granted this type of migration arrangement to 1,500 
migrants1 (Vargas Carrasco 2018). In this paper, I claim that the use of this and other exceptional measures 
is crucial in understanding the operation of the Mexican Transit Control Regime (MTCR) and its multiscale, 
transformative and adaptive characteristics. 
 
While encounters with border regimes shape migrants’ journeys and their strategies of mobility 
(Andersson 2014; Brigden and Mainwaring 2016; Schapendonk et al. 2020), border regimes are also 
influenced by and react to migrants’ mobility strategies, resilience and stubbornness (Fassin 2011). 
Although this influence often leads to reinforcing and militarising the policing of migration (Jones and 
Johnson 2016), it might also lead to the implementation of exceptional arrangements, as shown in the 
previous vignette. This paper considers that exemption is crucial for understanding the policing and 
enforcement of migration control in transit states. It argues that exemption is a distinctive bordering 
mechanism and practice to govern the migrant population that is not the target population of the control 
regime and, therefore, a way in which the transit states assume, react and use their role as countries of 
‘transit’. Thus, although multiscalar bordering lays at the very core of this type of control regime (Wonders 
2017), the examination of exemption in transit regimes draws attention to the multiscalar dimension of 
the micropolitics of bordering and the role of discretion therein. 
 
Exemption as a bordering mechanism and practice is examined through the issuing of exceptional 
migratory resolutions and, more particularly, its instrumentalisation at the convenience of the control 
regime. This approach is inspired by Nancy Wonders’ invitation to examine what she terms ‘border 
reconstruction projects’, defined as ‘state sponsored strategies designed to reinforce and/or reconstitute 
borders in response to challenges posed to nation-states and borders by globalization’ (2007: 34). Hence, 
although the MTCR fulfils the characteristics of a ‘state of exception’ (Agamben 2005), in this text, I do not 
aim to examine the sovereign power at the border and the politics of migration control (Salter 2008; 
Tazzioli and De Genova 2020), nor the multiple ways in which migrants experience and contest them 
(Varela Huerta and McLean 2019). Conversely, this paper examines exemption as a constitutive and yet 
disruptive aspect in the governmentality of transit migration control in Mexico. 
 
The issuing of exceptional migratory resolutions in the MTCR is used to bordering and ordering 
extracontinental migration in transit for practical and political reasons. By avoiding the elevated costs and 
other logistical difficulties involved in the expulsion of this population, the regime can uphold its focus on 
intercepting and deterring Central American migrants. That is, by exempting extracontinental migrants 
from deportation, the regime responds and recalibrates to continue achieving its aims; in the words of 
Nancy Wonders (2007), it ‘reconstructs’ itself. Yet, this does not mean that the logic of punishment and 
deterrence embedded in the regime is absent for these migrants; they, like the rest of the intercepted 
migrants, experience the state ‘bordered penality’ (Aas 2014; Barker 2017). However, what is different is 
that the result of the encounter between these migrants and the control regime is not expulsion but 
exemption. Thus, these migration arrangements are as much a part of Mexico’s ‘politics of hostility’ 
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(Domenech 2020) as the expulsion of migrants. By shedding light and problematising the use and 
instrumentalisation of exemption in the MTCR, this paper aims to contribute to the growing literature on 
bordering and bordering practices in so-called transit states (Coddington 2020; Frowd 2020). 
 
This paper continues as follows: after a brief methodologies section examining the use of freedom of 
information (FoI) requests as a method of enquiry and data gathering, I describe the main aspects of the 
MTCR as a facet of the externalisation of the US border control and map the most recent reverberation of 
US border and migration control agenda in Mexico’s governmentality of transit migration. I outline the 
main aspects of its implementation during the past 20 years, emphasising how Mexican migration policing 
has changed and the disputes and struggles that have pushed for transforming the regime’s practices. After 
discussing the regime’s bordering through expulsion approach, I delve into the examination of what I call 
bordering through exemption. I analyse Mexico’s governmentality of Asian and African migration in transit 
and identify four migration arrangements: (1) sporadic expulsion, (2) regularisation façade, (3) 
guardianship and (4) self-deportation. These arrangements respond to an instrumental rationality and 
show the intertwining of legal and extrajudicial procedures, the high degree of discretion, and, ultimately, 




FoI requests are used as a method of enquiry and data gathering. FoI, Keen (1992: 46) writes, ‘offers the 
possibility of unparalleled access to the working of one of our most pervasive and influential formal 
organisations, the federal government’. Further, in the light of the increasing official secrecy, FoI has 
proven to be a powerful tool in social science research and particularly in policing and security research 
(Belcher and Martin 2019; Walby and Luscombe 2020). This paper draws on a quantitative dataset of 
migrants apprehended by Mexican authorities and their migratory resolutions between 2010 to 2019. The 
information was obtained through several FoI requests to the Mexican National Migration Institute (INM), 
the Mexican border enforcement agency, about migration control enforcing actions. The analysis 
presented below is particularly based on apprehensions and migratory resolutions of African migrants 
(n = 31,558) and Asian migrants (n = 30,491). 
 
Although the use of FoI can overcome the methodological obstacles to investigate secretive or guarded 
organisations (Walby and Larsen 2012), we must not disregard the multiple methodological challenges 
faced when trying to use it as a method of data gathering systematically, including slowness of release, 
partial and incomplete data, and even the ‘malicious non-compliance’ (Roberts 1998: 9) but also technical 
aspects that hamper the systematisation and analysis of the information, such as lack of uniformity in 
datasets and poor quality of digitalised files. For the information examined here, the lack of uniformity of 
the dataset was especially challenging, with elements included or excluded, the decision to register 
nationality over the country of origin, or the naming of the migratory resolutions. As many other 
researchers have experienced (Bows 2019), all these intentional and unintentional obfuscations made it 
more complicated to conduct the statistical analysis. This lack of uniformity responds to the fact that the 
information was requested during two federal administrations (2012–2018 and 2018–2023), and given 
that in the INM, as in many other Mexican government agencies, public servants are hired on a temporal 
basis, it is most likely that they are removed from their positions when a new administration starts, 
particularly if it involves a transition of power like the one in 2017. 
 
The FoI requests focused on migration enforcement actions, particularly in the registry created for each 
migrant upon entry to the detention facility. Hence, the NoData input is noteworthy. This means that, even 
though a migrant was registered as being intercepted and detained in a migration detention facility, the 
INM does not have information on the outcome of the apprehension, usually reporting it as ‘null’ or in a 
blank space. Although this could be framed simply as incomplete data, in fact, it shows something more 
profound about the operation of the regime. Through a bureaucratic lens, NoData indicates that, although 
‘clerical control’ is a crucial aspect of the regime when a migrant enters a detention facility (Campos-
Delgado 2021), there is not enough attention to the development of migrant cases and migratory 
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resolutions. ‘Documents—the tangible evidence of bureaucratic inscription’, Sarah Horton writes (2020: 
4), ‘constitute a particularly useful site at which to analyze the power relationship between migrants and 
the state’. Thus, NoData outlines the administrative disarray but, more profoundly, shows that the INM is 
failing to be responsible and accountable for all the migrants, who, from the moment they are intercepted, 
remain in its legal custody; this failure could lead to illegal practices that would put migrants in a situation 
of even greater vulnerability. 
 
Despite the methodological drawbacks to access and systematise the data, the information received from 
the INM is taken as certified and official. Yet, it is essential to note the existence of discrepancies within the 
data obtained and the INM’s public information in the Yearbooks of Statistics2 (Unidad de Política 
Migratoria 2019). For example, on the number of African migrants intercepted from 2010 to 2019, the 
public information and that obtained through FoI differs by 10,314 cases. These discrepancies, as well as 
other ‘official silences’ identified, could be interpreted as a way to conceal the magnitude of Mexico’s role 
as a migration control enforcer and the multiple irregularities associated with this role. This underscores 
the strength of FoI as a critical method of enquiry to challenge and unveil these silences and irregularities. 
 
The Mexican Transit Control Regime 
 
‘In the last 30 years’, Nancy Hiemstra (2019: 44) notes, ‘the USA has constructed a complex architecture 
throughout Latin America aimed at stopping migrants in transit before they reach US borders’. She terms 
this process ‘the elasticisation of the US southern border’ (2019: 54) and identifies the development of 
security ‘partnerships’ with transit countries as one of the mechanisms through which the US 
reterritorialises and disperses its border policing activities. The MTCR implemented in Mexico is the 
epitome of this process. 
 
The MTCR was initiated in June 2001 through the US-led bilateral Plan of Action for Cooperation on Border 
Safety between Mexico and the US (US Department of State 2001). From this moment, with funding, 
equipment, and training from the US, Mexico’s migration management and bordering practices have been 
primarily focused on intercepting and deterring irregular migrants in transit through the US (Campos-
Delgado 2018). It should be noted that, although the regime’s blueprint includes all irregular migrants in 
transit, in practice, the regime has focused on the Central American population, to the point that, from 
2001 to 2019, the citizens of Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala represented 91 per cent of the migrants 
intercepted by Mexican authorities (Unidad de Política Migratoria 2019). The regime’s targeting is 
determined by geopolitics in the Central America–Mexico–US migration corridor and the predominance of 
Central American migratory flows, which, as analysed below, leads to differential enforcement of the 
regime. As for the policing of the regime, although highly concentrated in the southern border region, the 
MTCR is spread throughout the entire Mexican territory; this dissemination has created what Vogt (2017: 
12) conceptualises as an ‘arterial border’, ‘a complex social arena where migration flows are policed, 
exploited and contested’. 
 
Twenty Years of Enforcement 
The first 10 years of the regime’s operation had a securitising approach, attested by the rebranding in 2005 
of the INM as a national security agency. Intercepting and funnelling irregular migrants towards dangerous 
paths of mobility were the main bordering mechanisms (Amnesty International 2010). These, together 
with the proliferation of criminal actors as a result of the so-called ‘war against drugs’, which began in 
2006,3 and the impunity and corruption in the country, increased migrants vulnerability by making them 
a target for criminals (Bustamante 2010). Theft, extortion, rape and kidnapping are some of the most 
common crimes that migrants face when travelling through Mexico, with transit through the southern 
border region being particularly risky for them, mainly through Chiapas, Oaxaca and Veracruz (REDODEM 
2019). That is, there is consistency between the highest concentration of border enforcement and the 
vulnerability of migrants. Hence, the multiple displays of violence faced by migrants are created because 
of, and as part of, the regime (Tazzioli and De Genova 2020). 
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The enactment of the Mexican Migratory Act in 2011 changed the discourse of migration enforcement in 
Mexico, incorporating humanitarian rhetoric. This was the outcome of a gradual decriminalisation path in 
Mexico in response to lobbying and awareness-raising involvement from organised civil society and 
migrant advocates (Basok et al. 2015; Gonzalez-Murphy 2013). However, it was also an official reaction to 
the national and international consternation caused by the San Fernando massacre in August 2010, where 
Los Zetas, a criminal organisation, murdered 72 migrants. The Migratory Act was enacted in May 2011 and 
sixteen months after the Act’s Rules of Procedure. Nevertheless, what we see in practice is that 
humanitarian discourse is used to justify and legitimate severer border controls (Campos-Delgado and 
Côté-Boucher 2021). 
 
During the last decade, 2014 and 2019 are key moments to exemplify the reverberation of the US border 
and migration control agenda in Mexico’s migration control policy and policing. In July 2014, after the so-
called crisis of unaccompanied minor migrants at the US southern border (Rosenblum 2015), the Enrique 
Peña’s administration (2012–2018) launched the program Frontera Sur, ‘with the purpose’, Daniel 
Villafuerte Solis and María Aguilar wrote (2017: 50), ‘of sealing the border and preventing Central 
American migrants from reaching the United States’. In June 2019, a Mexico–US joint declaration stated 
that ‘given the dramatic increase in migrants moving from Central America through Mexico to the United 
States’, the Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador administration (2018–2023) agreed to ‘take unprecedented 
steps to increase enforcement to curb irregular migration, to include the deployment of its National Guard 
throughout Mexico, giving priority to its southern border’ (US Department of State 2019: 1). Both episodes, 
although they correspond to different administrations and political parties, answered to the US migration 
control agenda with militarisation and greater repression of irregular mobility, creating greater 
vulnerability for migrants and violations of their human rights as well as intimidation and persecution 
against migrant advocates (CEJIL 2019; REDODEM 2019). ‘A politics of hostility’, Eduardo Domenech 
emphasises (2020: 4), ‘is not limited, nor does it necessarily have to coincide with a period of government; 
it can precede it, exceed it, or determine a moment of varying durability’; the analysis of these episodes of 
strengthening border control in direct response to the US border-control agenda confirms that. 
 
The humanitarian rhetoric on the Migratory Act, together with the increasing securitisation and 
militarisation of the migrant trail, has turned the MTCR into a fully consolidated ‘military-humanitarian 
border’ (Pallister-Wilkins 2015; Tazzioli 2015), and, therefore, as will be examined below, bordering 
practices are guided by this framing. 
 
Bordering through Expulsion 
 
The MTCR focuses on stopping and deterring Central American migrants in transit. For this population, 
the regime operates through an intercept–detain–expel circuit: 97 per cent of migrants intercepted by 
Mexican authorities are expelled (Unidad de Política Migratoria 2019). It is noteworthy that 99 per cent of 
these expulsions are framed as ‘assisted returns’ (or voluntary deportations), a bordering practice that, as 
Stephan Dünnwald observes, hides the mandatory feature and the coercive state’s role by focusing on the 
returnee (2013: 232). Consistent with the intercept–detain–expel circuit, Central American migrants have 
a low chance of being granted refugee status in Mexico. From 2013 to 2018, Mexican authorities received 
43,717 requests for refugee status from migrants from Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala, which 
represented 73 per cent of the total, with percentages of acceptance of 19, 38, and 21 for Honduras, El 
Salvador, and Guatemala, respectively (COMAR 2019). Also, like in other migration control regimes, 
waiting is used as a technology to control and dissuade migrants requesting refugee status (Jacobsen, 
Karlsen and Khosravi 2021); by April 2019, out of the 43,717 requests received, only 41 per cent had been 
resolved by the Mexican authorities (COMAR 2019). 
 
Yet, in the ‘temporal bordering’ (Tazzioli 2018; Khosravi 2021) inflicted on Central American migrants, 
waiting and haste are synchronised as migration management technologies. Celerity is the characteristic 
of the intercept–detain–expel circuit: on average, migrants are held in detention between three and five 
days (CNDH 2019: 93). This celerity is possible, at a normative level, because of the international 
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agreements signed (2003, 2006, 2007 and 2009) between Mexico and Honduras, Guatemala, and El 
Salvador to regulate the expulsion or repatriation of migrants and, at a practical level, because migrants 
are deported massively by land. 
 
Detention infrastructures and dynamics are also organised following this circuit and its celerity 
characteristic. Detention facilities are conceived and operated to hold migrants for short periods; out of 
the 59 detention facilities spread throughout the country, 14 are allowed to hold migrants no longer than 
48 hours and 12 no longer than seven days. Most of these temporary facilities, and even some removal 
centres, have limited infrastructure; for example, there are no dining rooms, patios or recreation areas. 
When this is the case, migrants must remain inside their usually overcrowded cells all day (CNDH 2019: 
136). Besides, as migrants are usually quickly processed and expelled, there is no laundry service, and they 
are not provided with clean clothes (CCINM 2017: 93). However, this should not be examined as an 
inadvertent structural deficiency of the regime, as I argued somewhere else (Campos-Delgado 2021); the 
precarious and dire conditions within Mexico’s detention centres are articulated to control, punish and 
deter migration. ‘The political dream of assisted return schemes’, William Walters argues (2016: 438), ‘is 
to provide a sufficient level of material inducement such that the migrant places themselves on the plane, 
without the need for guards, restraints or any spectacle of enforcement’. In the case of the MTCR, the 
appalling conditions of the detention centres could be seen as the material inducement for the migrants to 
sign their voluntary deportation. 
 
The regime’s aim for celerity, directly and indirectly, increases the vulnerability of migrants. Detained 
migrants are not informed or superficially informed about their rights, such as their right to seek asylum 
in Mexico, and are frequently coerced to accept to sign their voluntary deportation (CCINM 2017: 105). 
Once deported, given that the conditions they are seeking to leave behind have not changed, migrants are 
likely to travel again shortly and be involved in situations of greater risk and vulnerability; for instance, 
during 2018, eight out of 10 migrants from Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador declared their intention 
to travel irregularly through Mexico again (EMIF-SUR 2019). In other words, expedited deportations are 
also aligned with the reproduction of the ‘cross, apprehend, deport, cross’ border circuit (Nail 2015: 31), 
which forces migrants into even more precarious and dire conditions. 
 
Bordering through Exemption 
 
This section examines the use of exemption as a bordering mechanism and practice in the MTCR. Drawing 
on statistical information on the Asian and African migrant population intercepted by Mexican authorities 
from 2010 to 2019, four migration arrangements are identified: (1) sporadic expulsion, (2) regularisation 
façade, (3) guardianship and (4) self-deportation. 
 
From 2010 to 2019, Mexican authorities expulsed one per cent of migrants from Africa and six per cent 
from Asia. This percentage is striking when compared to the 97 per cent deportation rate for Central 
American migrants mentioned above. Although Mexican authorities do enforce deportations to migrants 
from Asia and Africa, the numbers remain insignificant compared to other forms of bordering and other 
groups. In other words, although detention and expulsion are used as the main mechanisms in the 
governmentality of Central American migration, sporadic expulsion guides the bordering of 
extracontinental flows. 
 
According to Article 133 of the Migratory Act, the conditions under which irregular adult migrants can 
regularise their immigration status are (i) having a direct familial relationship with a Mexican citizen or a 
non-citizen with a residence status, that is, a spouse, parent or child; (ii) having been a witness or victim 
of a serious crime, delito grave, committed on national territory; or (iii) ‘if the foreigner’s level of 
vulnerability hinders or makes impossible his or her deportation or assisted return’ (LM 2011: 50). When 
the migrant meets any of these requirements, the INM issues an oficio de salida de la estación migratoria,4 
releasing the migrant from detention. From 2010 to 2019, 60 per cent of migrants from Africa and 41 per 
cent from Asia were released to initiate regularisation. Yet, although this could indicate ‘hospitality’ within 
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the MTCR (DeBono 2019), the real possibilities of regularisation are limited because of the INM’s scarce 
infrastructure and deficient bureaucracies (Bustamante, Martínez and Montañez 2020). Thus, as Martha 
Rojas Wiesner and Tanya Basok (2020) examine through the concept of ‘legal illegality’, these limited 
possibilities push migrants to engage in alternative and sometimes illegal practices in order to be legalised 
such as acquiring fraudulent documents. Further, the probability of migrants obtaining protection through 
refugee status is low, and those who receive it must endure a long wait. In 2018, only three (out of 185) 
migrants from Asia and two (out of 119) migrants from Africa obtained this status. However, what is 
striking is not only the low number of approvals but also the high abandonment rate of 74 and 58 per cent, 
respectively (Unidad de Política Migratoria 2018). Most likely, they abandoned their refugee application 
in Mexico to resume their journey towards the US; this could be because they never intended to seek refuge 
in Mexico or because the poor Mexican institutional response, perhaps along with other socioeconomic 
factors, discouraged them. Thus, there is a regularisation façade used similarly and disruptively by both 
migrants and authorities. 
 
Guardianship, that is, the release of a migrant into someone’s custody, is another exceptional arrangement 
to release intercepted migrants from detention. According to Article 214 of the Migratory Act’s Rules of 
Procedure, this arrangement can be made when ‘the immigration authority has a legal impediment to 
resolve the immigration situation of a foreign person’; that is, when the INM did not provide a resolution 
after 60 working days after the migrant was intercepted. In this case, the custody of the migrant will be 
granted to a person or institution of recognised solvency whose purpose is linked to the protection of 
human rights’ (R-LM 2012: 60). The initiation of the process must be by the guardian, and the bond is 
established at the discretion of the migration authority; this means that migrants without social networks 
in the country are less likely to have the possibility of being released through this exceptional arrangement. 
This explains the low representation of migrants from Asia and Africa in this case: under this arrangement, 
between 2010 and 2019, Mexican migration authorities released from detention 233 and 201 migrants 
from Africa and Asia, respectively, representing 0.7 and 0.6 per cent of the total of intercepted migrants 
from those continents. 
 
Self-deportation is the quintessential exceptional arrangement. The FT and DD are used recurrently as 
formal figures to explain that migrants are released from detention and must leave the country by their 
own means; that is, they can freely transit in the country as long as they are moving towards a border. 
Although a conventional figure, the FT is not stipulated in the Migratory Act and, nonetheless, in the INM 
records, it is distinguished from DD, a migratory resolution that it does appears in the law as oficio de salida 
del país.5 Yet, since, in practice, these terms refer to the fact that the Mexican transit control apparatus will 
turn a blind eye to migrants’ mobility to the US, both terms are used interchangeably or are replaced with 
the euphemism salvoconducto de salida. The exemption from state deportation through these 
arrangements is issued at the discretion of agents due to the slow response of home countries, the 
migrants’ lack of consular or diplomatic representation in Mexico or, as shown in the vignette at the 
beginning of this paper, due to political pressure (Narváez Gutiérrez 2015). From 2010 to 2019, 38 per 
cent of migrants from Africa and 52 per cent from Asia were issued a self-deportation migratory resolution. 
 
Bordering through exemption responses to instrumental rationality shows the intertwining of legal and 
extrajudicial procedures and the high degree of discretion but also underlines the central importance of 
logistics in bordering. While deportation by land is the key factor for enforcing the bordering through 
expulsion, the significant financial outlays and logistical challenges posed by the expulsion of 
extracontinental migrants are one of the critical reasons for the bordering through exemption, and, thus, 
by circumventing these outlays and challenges, the regime remains afloat and continues to focus on 




From 2001 to 2019, according to official public information, Mexican authorities intercepted 2,613,915 
irregular migrants and expelled 2,398,419 (Unidad de Política Migratoria 2019); however, when closely 
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examining the reports of migration resolutions, differential enforcement of the regime is revealed. In this 
paper, I argued that Mexico’s ‘politics of hostility’ (Domenech 2020) towards irregular migrants in transit 
to the US could not be understood simply by examining the MTCR bordering through expulsion approach 
but in direct relation to its bordering through exemption strategy. Thus, I claimed that the issuing of 
exceptional migratory resolutions in the MTCR is used for bordering and ordering extracontinental 
migration in transit, but more importantly, to maintain the regime’s focus on intercepting and deterring 
Central American migrants. 
 
Through the analysis of the MTCR, I made a case on exemption as a distinctive bordering mechanism and 
practice to govern the migrant population that is not the target population of the control regime. I 
emphasised that by bordering through exemption, the transit states assume, react and use their role as a 
country of ‘transit’; ultimately, this adaptive and transformative aspect of the control regimes sheds light 
on the multiscale objectives of border control practices and the micropolitics of bordering. 
 
Further, although a naive reading might consider that the instrumentalisation of exemption works, to some 
extent, for extracontinental migrants’ mobility objectives, it does not. The normalisation and routinisation 
of exemption highlight the deepening of the regime’s ‘abnormality’ (Aas 2014; Campos-Delgado 2021). 
This ‘reconstruction project’ (Wonders 2007) is anchored in a migration securitisation framework and 
responds to the US border-control agenda. Therefore, it is also part of the politics of invisibility that seeks 




I would like to thank Iréri Ceja Cárdenas, John Doering-White and the two anonymous reviewers for their 
generous and enriching comments. 
 
 
Correspondence: Amalia Campos-Delgado, PhD. Postdoc/Lecturer. Van Vollenhoven Institute for Law, 
Governance and Society, Leiden Law School, Leiden University. Steenschuur 25, 2311 ES Leiden. P.O. Box 
9520, 2300 RA Leiden, Netherlands. a.e.campos.delgado@law.leidenuniv.nl  
 
 
1 The 2014 (Central American) migrant caravan was an act of collective agency that undermined the legitimacy of the regime by 
shedding light on the vulnerability of migrants in transit through Mexico. Thus, the exceptional measures granted to this 
population were not a structured response but a reactive response to the political upheaval generated as a result. 
2 However, it should be noted that INM’s public statistical information is not definitive. It is common for the INM to ‘update’ the 
Yearbooks of Statistics. These updates are usually quite significant, for example, in 2016, the difference between the first and 
second version (updated 13/09/2018) was of +19,887 apprehensions; in particular, about African and Asian migrants, the 
difference between the first and second version was of +483 and +97, respectively (Unidad de Política Migratoria 2019). 
3 The main criticism to this strategy is the generalisation of the violence it created. Some estimations declare that, between 2007 
and 2012, approximately 60,000 people died, including drug traffickers, security forces and civilians (Shirk and Wallman 
2015). Additionally, it caused increasing violence in the daily life of the population. As the organisations lost their leaders, 
lieutenants started combats not only for succession but also for expansion and diversification of illegal activities such as 
extortion, kidnapping and human trafficking (Dudley 2012). 
4 This is a ‘resolution that allows the departure of the foreign person from the immigration station, to initiate regularization 
procedures, within the term granted by the immigration authority’ (R-LM 2012: 2). According to the Article 111 of the 
Migration Law, this migratory resolution should also be issued to migrants who were held in detention for longer than 60 
working days (LM 2011: 40). 
5 This is a ‘resolution issued by the migration authorities … in which the foreign person in an irregular migratory situation is 
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